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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 09/07/2005 Accident number: 417 
Accident time: 08:40 Accident Date: 08/07/2004 
Where it occurred: Periya Pullumalai, 
Batticaloa 
Country: Sri Lanka 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 21/07/2004 
ID original source: SL-10 Name of source: MH 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: P2Mk2 P4Mk1 AP 
blast 
Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
soft 
Date record created: 09/07/2005 Date  last modified: 09/07/2005 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 3 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
use of rake (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
Accident report 
A formal Board of Inquiry was arranged by the National Mine Action authority and its report 
made available in 2005. It is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
BOI Team Members: 
UNDP TA, DMAO-Vavuniya, [Name excised] 
3rd party demining group Mine Action Specialist, [Name excised] (Programme Manager)  
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Local Government Servant and National Advisor, [Name excised] 
Reference: Accident Investigation & BOI, 8th July 2004, minefield site at Periya Pullumalai, 
Batticaloa 
References:  
1) Terms of reference for investigation of demining accident in Sri Lanka. 
2) Standard Working Procedures (SWP) For reporting and investigation of demining 
accidents and incidents of the Sri Lankan Mine Action Programme 
3) Standards Operating Procedures – [Demining group] for Mine Action  
 
1.  Introduction 
This report presents the findings of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) into the circumstances and 
events of a mine accident, which involved [Demining group] deminer, [Name excised].  The 
accident took place on the 7th July 2004, during demining operations in a minefield known as 
Periya Pullumalai in the District of Batticaloa.  
 
a. History of the Minefield 
This minefield is located in the area known as Periya Pullumalai and is near the village of 
Periya Pullumalai, in the District of Batticaloa. The minefield is bounded on the North and 
East by the Chenkalad Division, on the South by the Nuwaragala Forest Reserve and on the 
West by Ampara District. The minefield is on the Southern side of the Batticaloa to Badulla 
road, on the Southern edge of Pullumalai. 
[The Demining group] has been working on this site since 1st May 2004.  During clearance 
operations a total of 64 P4-Mk 1 anti personnel blast landmines had been recovered at the 
site. Mines on this site have generally been laid in strips and sub surface laid to an 
approximately depth of 7cm. The deminer involved in the accident was in half section, BD3, 
who had been working on community support clearance of a school and market, until 7 days 
prior to the mine accident.  The deminer and his half section, BD3, started work on the main 
site on the 10th May 2004. 
 
b. Investigation Team 
Following the direction of [Name excised], Special Advisor to the NSCMA, [Name excised] 
(Technical Advisor District Mine Action Office Vavuniya), [Name excised] ([3rd party demining 
group] Programme Manager) and [Name excised], representative of the District Government 
Office were duly appointed to conduct the investigation under the authority of the BOI terms of 
reference.  See attached Annex A-1 to A-2.  The members of the BOI made the investigation, 
conclusions and recommendations in accordance with the BOI terms of reference and in line 
with the Standard Working Procedures (SWP) for the reporting and investigation of demining 
accidents and incidents of the Sri Lankan Mine Action Programme. 
 
2. General Findings 
The general findings of the BOI are listed below: 
a. Details of the Accident 
(1)  The accident 
On 7th July 2004, Deminer, [The Victim], was continuing clearance on a one metre wide safe 
lane as detailed by his section leader at the 06.45hrs daily briefing, that morning.  See Annex 
D-1 to D-4 “Statements of Concerned Personnel/eye Witnesses.   
The lane followed a P4 AP blast mine strip where [The Victim] had found three mines the 
previous day.  On the morning of the accident [The Victim] had worked one half hour shift 
from 07.30 hrs to 08.00hrs before having breakfast from 08.00 hrs to 08.30 hrs.  [The Victim] 
then started his second half hour shift at 08.30hrs, with his half diction BD3.  The accident 
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took place at 08.40hrs, ten minutes into [The Victim]’s second half hour shift. At the time of 
the accident [The Victim] was using a heavy rake on the first phase of the three phase raking 
drill. 
 
(2)  The Site 
The site is on open ground with medium to long grass with some areas of dense undergrowth 
and sporadic bushes and trees.  The site of the accident was medium length grass with no 
undergrowth.  The site is on a slight rise on the Southern side of the site.  See Annex E-1 
“Site Sketch Map”.  The ground consists of loam fertile soil, with a soft to medium/hard 
density depending on the moisture content of the soil. 
 
[The photograph above shows the accident lane with yellow pickets marking where mines had 
previously been found.] 
 
(3)  The Mine 
The crater caused by the explosion was 30 cm wide and 9 cm deep.  Investigation of the 
crater failed to provide any evidence of mine fragments, but the size of the crater is consistent 
with the blast one would expect from a P4 AP blast mine.  This is also consistent with the fact 
that only P4 AP blast mines have been previously found on this site. 
 
b. Sequence of Events 
The table [below] presents the sequence of events from the start of demining operations on 
the morning of the accident, Wednesday 7th July 2004, until the arrival of the BOI team on the 
morning of Thursday 8th July 2004.  All relevant eye witnesses’ statements have been 
checked and confirmed during the BOI and are attached at Annex D-1 to D-4 “Statements of 
Concerned Personnel/eye Witnesses” [See Other documents].   
1) 06.45hrs: All deminers attended the morning briefing given by section leader, [Name 
excised]. 
2) 07.00hrs: The other half section started work.  Deminer, [The victim], and his half 
section BD3 were resting during this shift. 
3) 07.30hrs: The other half section changed over shift.  Deminer, [The victim], started 
his 30 minute first shift of the day, with his half section BD3. 
4) 08.00hrs: The half section BD3 with deminer, [The victim], change shift and had 
breakfast. 
5) 08.30hrs: The half section BD3 with deminer, [The victim], change shift and started 
work on second shift of the day. 
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6) 08.35hrs: Section leader, [Name excised], visited deminer, [The victim], as part of his 
supervisory duties.  During this visit the section leader instructed the deminer, [The 
victim], to put his visor down as he was working with the visor up. 
7) 08.40hrs: Mine explodes.  The deminer, [The victim], receives cuts to his face and left 
forearm.  Section leader calls the medic and driver to medical station via radio and 
goes to scene of accident to find deminer, [The victim], seated with his hands to his 
face. 
8) 08.45hrs: Deminer, [The victim], walked to the medical station, with assistance from 
the section leader and the driver, [Name excised].  The medical station was some 
100 metres from the accident site.  On arrival at the medical station the deminer was 
given first aid treatment to the cuts to his face.  [The victim] was then dispatched to 
Chenkalady Hospital by the site ambulance. 
9) 08.50hrs: [Demining group] District office in Batticaloa was informed about the 
accident via radio. 
10) 09.15hrs: Deminer, [The victim], arrived at Chenkalady Hospital and was treated for 
minor cuts and dirt in eyes.  He was kept in hospital overnight for observation, due to 
concerns about his eyes. 
11) 09.30 hrs: [Demining group] Technical operations manager, [Name excised], arrived 
at Chenkalady Hospital to check on the medical status of the deminer, [The victim]. 
12) 10.00hrs: [Demining group] Technical field manager, [Name excised], arrived at 
accident site and interviews witnesses and took written statements. 
13) 09.00hrs 15.00hrs: BOI team arrive at the [Demining group] office in Batticaloa and 
received a briefing from [Demining group] technical operations manager, [Name 
excised].  BOI Team leader, [Name excised], gave a briefing on the objectives of the 
BOI.  BOI team interviewed the injured deminer at Chenkalady Hospital, then move to 
site to conduct investigation. 
 
c. Injuries to Personnel 
The deminer, [The victim], suffered minor injuries to his face and left forearm.  The facial 
injuries, although bloody, proved to be superficial.  [See Medical report.] Due to concerns over 
the dust and foreign particles in [The victim]’s eyes, he was kept in Chenkalady Hospital 
overnight for observation.   
 
d. Damage to Equipment 
It is standard practice in [the Demining group] to wear protective clothing (PPE) and visor 
whilst operating in the minefield area. Therefore at the time of the incident, the injured 
deminer was wearing standard uniform long trousers, T-shirt, work gloves, work boots, 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), safety visor and helmet. 
The only damage to equipment was very slight blast damage to the point of one prong of the 
heavy rake and damage to the inside of the visor. 
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[Damage to the head of the rake is shown above.] 
The damage and blast marks to the visor could only have accrued if the visor was up at the 
time of the explosion.  [Damage included blast mark on the inside of the visor and on the front 
of its supporting plastic helmet.] 
e.  Training and experience of personnel 
Deminer [The victim] (injured deminer) Graduated 10th March 2004 (Third Batticaloa 
Demining Class).  
Section Leader, [Name excised] Graduated 20 November 2003 (First Batticaloa Demining 
Class). 
f. Timings (Daily work schedule) 
[The Demining group] deminers work a shift system of 30 minutes on, 30 minutes off.  At the 
time of the accident the deminer was 10 minutes into his second 30-minute shift of the day, 
following a 30-minute rest period for breakfast.  The normal daily routine is listed below. 
06.45 hrs  Daily briefing 
07.00 hrs  Work starts, 30 minute shift system 
07.30/08.00hrs  30 Minute break for breakfast, depending on shift 
11.00 – 14.00 hrs Lunch break 
14.00 – 18.00 hrs Work restarts until end of day 
f. Leave and rest periods 
The deminer had taken 8 days leave, 18 days prior to the accident from 12 – 20 June 2004.  
The deminer had a 30 minute break approximately ten minutes prior to the accident. 
g. Internal Quality Assurance 
No written records are kept regarding internal Quality Assurance (QA) checks.  The 
[Demining group] QA policy is outlined on page 45 of their SOP.  Regular QA checks are 
performed each day as a matter of course by the section leaders.  The [Demining group] TA 
carries out QA and QC checks as part of his technical support to four [Demining group] 
teams. 
The deminer received a QA check from his Section Leader 5 minutes before the accident.  
The Team Leader, [Name excised], stated to the BOI that he had verbally warned the 
deminer, [the Victim], “more than once” to work with his visor down.  See Annex D-1 to D-4 
“Statements of Concerned Personnel/eye Witnesses”. 
h. External QA  
No external QA has taken place. 
i. PPE and other equipment 
(1) PPE 
Although the deminer, [the Victim], was wearing the required PPE in accordance with his 
organisations SOPs, his visor was up at the time of the explosion.  This breach of SOPs led 
directly to the injuries to his face, which would have other wise been prevented. 
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[The Demining group took the picture above to illustrate the position of the visor at the time of 
the accident. Note that the plastic hat is not PPE and is not recorded as a “helmet” under 
PPE.] 
(2)  Metal detector 
Metal detectors are not used as part of the raking clearance drill.  However, metal detectors 
are used by the TA as part of the QC checks. 
j. Refresher Training 
The majority of [Demining group] deminers graduated on the 10th March 2004 (Third 
Batticaloa Demining Class).  The majority of senior deminers graduated on the 20 November 
2003 (First Batticaloa Demining Class).  Due to the relatively recent time since these training 
courses no refresher training had been conducted. 
k. Medical Support 
The level of medical support and evacuation available on the day of the accident was 
appropriate to the needs and in accordance with the organisation’s SOP. There had been a 
formal medical CASEVAC evacuation practice on the 10th May 2004 and regular internal QA 
of the medical support was carried out every month. The medic and all those involved should 
be commended for implementing rapid and effective medical treatment and evacuation of the 
casualty.  This resulted in the casualty receiving first aid treatment within five minutes and 
arriving at the hospital within 30 minutes. 
l. Cause (or Contributing factors) of the Injury 
(1) SOP of the organisation. 
There is no indication to suggest the accident was caused by an error or oversight of the 
organisation’s SOP.  Section leaders and overall supervisors appeared to a high standard, 
however the deminer involved in the incident was warned previously by the section leader for 
working with his visor up.  The BOI recommend that the organisational SOPs be reviewed for 
possible improvements.  One possible area for amendment could be additional drills for 
misted visor procedures. 
(2) Application of SOP by the deminer involved. 
The BOI could not establish conclusively why the accident took place, as no eyewitnesses 
saw the incident at the time of the explosion.  However, it was obvious that the deminer had 
his visor up at the time of the explosion.  Damage and blast marks to the inside of the visor 
could only have accrued if the visor was up at the time of the explosion.  The deminer insisted 
that the visor was down at the time of the explosion but could give no explanation for why the 
accident had taken place.  It is the opinion of the BOI that the injuries to the deminers face 
were a direct result of the deminer’s failure to follow the organisations SOPs.  The deminer’s 
lack of attentiveness may also have been a major contributing factor to the accident.   
 (3) Command and control structure imposed by the agency. 
There is no evidence to suggest that a failure in the command and control structure of the 
organisation led to the accident. However, the fact that the section leader had verbally 
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reprimanded the deminer for working with his visor up, 5 minutes prior to the accident, may 
mean that more serious discipline action should have been taken, rather than a verbal 
reprimand.   
(4) Environmental conditions 
There had been heavy rain the night before the demining accident that may have softened the 
soil to such an extent that the deminer used to the previous days conditions may have used 
too much force when raking.  The deminer involved stated that the conditions were different 
due to the heavy rain the previous night.  However, this explanation does not give a probable 
cause for the explosion as the deminer had already worked a complete 30 minute shift that 
morning.  Therefore the deminer had more than sufficient time to notice the change in soil 
conditions and compensate for such change.  
(5) Security of the minefield 
Control of access to and security of the minefield itself was adequate.  The location of the 
explosion was consistent with the strip of mines that had previously been cleared.  The 
moving or relaying of the mine that caused the explosion is not suspected. 
3. Conclusions  
The BOI considers three possible scenarios for the cause of the accident, all of which are 
related to the attentiveness of the deminer. These are: 
(1) Option 1 – Lack of attentiveness 
The physical evidence proves that the deminer visor was up at the time of the explosion.  
However, the deminer denied that he was working with the visor up, but could give no 
plausible reason for the accident.  A definitive cause of the accident could not be found as the 
deminer was the only eyewitness at the time of the explosion, but his statement contradicts 
the physical evidence.  This contradiction combined with the section leader’s statement that 
the deminer was reprimanded for working with his visor up, just minutes before the accident, 
leads the BOI to deduce that the deminer was not attentive at the time of the accident. 
Although [the Demining group] has been using the rake method since they started demining 
operations this is the first reported accident during raking demining operations.  Therefore an 
error in drills due to a lack of concentration, on the part of the deminer, seems to be the 
logical cause of the accident. 
(2) Option 2 – Change in soil & Environmental Conditions 
As previously mentioned, heavy rain the night prior to the accident had softened the soil and 
increased the humidity at the site.  The deminer stated that the rain had changed the soil 
conditions.  However, if the deminer had noticed the change in soil conditions then he should 
have automatically made allowances for the changed conditions.  The increase in humidity on 
the morning of the accident led to misting of visors, which caused the deminers to lift and 
wipe the visor clean.  This may have led the deminer to work with his visor up. 
(3) Option 3 – Inappropriate Raking Drills 
The deminer involved in the accident had found 3 P4 AP blast mines the day before the 
accident and was within 5 metres of completing his safe lane.  As no mines had been found 
that morning, where expected, in the strip the deminer may have been under the impression 
that the mine strip had finished.  This may have caused the deminer to rush and use 
inappropriate and careless raking drills. 
4. BOI Findings 
It is the unanimous opinion of the members of the BOI that option 1, is the most likely 
scenario for the cause of the mine accident, with possible contributing factors from option 2 
and 3.  Namely that the deminer, [the Victim], was not sufficiently attentive, which led to the 
initiation of the mine.  In addition, his breach of the organisations SOPs led to his injuries 
being worse that they would have been.  Although the section leader did give [the Victim] a 
verbal reprimand, more severe disciplinary action would have been appropriate as [the Victim] 
had worked with his visor up on a number of occasions. 
5. Recommendations  
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a. Refresher Training 
[The Demining group] should conduct short refresher training to highlight the issues raised in 
this report and to reinforce the importance of following the agencies SOPs.   
Based on the BOI initial findings the [Demining group] has taken action to implement a 
system of regular monthly refresher training sessions and are considering implementing a full 
refresher training course.   
b. Discipline Action 
The agencies involved should consider taking appropriate discipline action against the 
deminer, as they deem fit.   
Based on the BOI initial findings the [Demining group] convened a section leader’s tribunal.  
The result of the tribunal was that the deminer, [the Victim], was issued a formal written 
warning.  The tribunal also recommended that a blanket verbal warning be issued to all 
deminers. 
c. Supervision 
Team leaders should be reminded of the importance of not only supervising the deminers but 
also the importance of taking appropriate disciplinary action when deminers fail to follow 
SOPs.   
Based on the BOI initial findings the [Demining group] held a Section Leaders meeting where 
the authority and responsibilities of the section leaders was reiterated. 
 
d. Review of SOP 
It is recommended that the [Demining group] SOPs be reviewed to see if additional 
procedures are required.  Based on the BOI initial findings the [Demining group] are 
implementing a review of the SOPs.  
 
f. External QA & QC 
The DMAO should implement a programme of external QA and QC as soon as the QA/QC 
teams are fully operational and sufficient resources are available.  
 
6. Summary 
In summary the BOI team were unanimous in its conclusion that the logical cause for the 
explosion was due to operator error (the deminer) with possible contributing factors caused by 
a change in soil and environmental conditions, due to heavy rain the previous night.  The 
extent of the deminer’s injuries, although minor, were worsened due to his failure to follow the 
organisational SOP. 
The organisation and medical evacuation drills were very well implemented, this was due in 
no small part to the focus and importance places on medical support and casualty evacuation 
drills by [Demining group] TA, [Name excised], which led to the rapid and effective treatment 
of the casualty.  The site medic should also be commended for dealing with the situation in an 
effective and professional manner.  
The BOI were also unanimous in their appreciation of the professional and transparent 
attitude of the representative of [The Demining group] in assisting the BOI enquiry.  The 
member of the BOI wish to thank everyone involved with supporting the investigation, at short 
notice. 
 
Sighed and dated: 18th July 2004 
Board of Inquiry Team Leader, District Mine Action Office Vavuniya, UNDP Technical Advisor 
 
[Photographs showed damage to the visor and the plastic helmet (from the front). Captions 
included the statement that: “…working area where the deminer was raking at the time of the 
explosion.  Note short grass with dry but relatively soft soil, with no large roots.”] 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 544 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 30 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Short visor 
(raised) 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Arm 
minor Eyes 
minor Face 
COMMENT 
See Medical report. 
Medical report 
The IMSMA casualty report appended to the Board of Inquiry report stated:  
“First aid given within 5 minutes of explosion…[Victim] reached Chenkaladi Hospital, 
Batticoa… within 30 minutes.” 
Injuries: 
“Slight cuts to left cheek and bruising to left side of face. Blast abrasions to the left forearm, 
with dust and dirt particles in both eyes.  The Doctor’s prognosis is that he will make a full 
recovery.” 
Photographs taken the day after the accident showed a small swelling on the cheek and light 
abrasion on the arm. 
The [Demining group] “Initial; Investigation report” recorded that: 
“Treatments given: Medic conducted initial treatment, cleaned wounds on site and then the 
deminer was taken to nearest hospital. He was examined by doctor and no treatment given 
but referred to eye hospital to ascertain if there was any damage to the eye. Eye was 
examined and cleaned at the eye hospital. The eye was covered with a bandage and he was 
retained at the hospital for further observation.” 
 
Related papers 
Demining group internal INITIAL REPORT 
1. Team name/number: BD3 
2. Location (Province, District, Village: Batticaloa District, Periya Pullumalai Village 
3. Date and time of incident: 7 Jul 2004, 08.40 
4. Name people injured:  [Name excised] 
              a. Description of injuries: Small cut on left cheek and left elbow. Dust in one eye 
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b. Treatments given: Medic conducted initial treatment, cleaned wounds on site 
and then the deminer was taken to nearest hospital. He was examined by doctor and 
no treatment given but referred to eye hospital to ascertain if there was any damage 
to the eye. Eye was examined and cleaned at the eye hospital. The eye was covered 
with a bandage and he was retained at the hospital for further observation. 
c. Current condition of casualties: No pain, resting comfortably in hospital 
5. Evacuation Routes and Destinations: Direct from site to hospital in Chenkaladi 
north of Batticaloa town. 
6. List equipment/facilities damaged: Visor and heavy rake damaged 
7. Describe how the incident occurred: Deminer was demining with a rake in his lane    
when he detonated a mine. We don't know at this stage if he was using incorrect 
drills, but from the injuries sustained and the damage to the visor it looks as if the 
visor was either not down fully, or the helmet was not correctly  fitted. 
8. Any other information including:
a. Did the incident occur in a cleared, safe or contaminated area? Contaminated 
b. Device type (if known): AP mine Pakistani P4  
 
9. Other information? Post accident and evacuation drills went well with the casualty 
arriving in hospital within thirty minutes.  
Board of Inquiry convened consisting of UN Technical Advisor, representative of 
another demining Agency and a representative from the Government Agent's office. 
 Sent by [Demining group] Technical Operations Manager, [Name excised], 8th July 2004. 
 
Statements 
The following statements were appended as Annexes to the Board of Inquiry report. They are 
reproduced as received, apart from the exclusion of identifying names. 
 
Reference: Statements of concerned personnel / eye witnesses 
 
Introduction: 
Initial hand written statements were taken by [Demining group] Technical Field Manager, 
[Name excised], on the day of the accident.  These hand written reports where then translated 
and typed up at [the Demining group]’s office in Batticaloa.  In all 7 statements were written by 
[Demining group] staff, 4 of these statements were discounted as [the individuals giving 
statements] could only confirm hearing the explosion but were not eye witnesses and were 
some considerable distance from the site of the accident. 
The 3 remaining statements are attached below.  One statement is from the injured deminer 
Mr. K. Jeykumar, with comments from BOI interview and two statements are from section 
leader Mr. T. Mathanasunther Periyaoullumali.  During the BOI, the statements of the relevant 
personnel were confirmed and expanded on during interviews. BOI comments and additional 
information, where relevant, is included at the end of the individual’s statement. 
Reference: Victim Statement 
As usual today morning I went to do my demining work with all instruments and tools.  
Normally we follow all the rules and regulations for deminers, which include the safety 
measures also.  I have started my work around 7.30 a.m. After I had my breakfast at about 
8.00 a.m.  I have restarted my work at 8.30 a.m. When I was doing mines clearing work on 
my lane I have seen a small lump in my clearing lane.  When I try to shape the lump by using 
heavy rake a mine set-off.  After the mine explode I have feel that it was bleeding on my face 
10 
and my forearms, I covered my face by fingers and sat down on the spot, team leader took 
me to the medic spot which is situated in the main lane.  Medic gave me some first aid and 
took me to the Chenkalady Hospital within 30 minutes.  To check my eyes I have admitted at 
Batticaloa base Hospital.  More than this the team leader [Name excised] checked me around 
2 to 3 minutes before the accident.  When the accident took place I had my helmet and visor 
in the proper way.   Signed: [The accident Victim] 
BOI Interview: 
The following observations were made during an interview of [The Victim], by the BOI team at 
the Batticaloa Hospital on the 8th July 2004.  The BOI confirmed the written statements taken 
by [the Demining group], the previous day. The following questions and answers should be 
seen as an amendment to the initial statement of the individual. 
BOI: How long have you been working as a deminer and which method do you use? 
Deminer: Six (6) months – rake method. 
BOI:  How many mines have you cleared so far? 
Deminer: Four or five. 
BoI: Could you explain to me how you use the rake, what is your normal body and 
head position? 
Deminer: My left foot and arm are in front and my head and eyes are focused to the place 
where I’m raking. 
BoI:  Did you find mines in that working lane before? 
Deminer: Yes, I found 3 P4 in the same lane the day before. 
BoI:  How deep were these mines were buried? 
Deminer: Approx. 7cm 
BoI:  And the mine which caused the accident? 
Deminer: When the detonation happened I had reached approx 7cm. 
BoI:  Which position was your visor when the accident happened? 
Deminer: I had the visor down. 
BOI:  Can you give any reason why the accident took place? 
Deminer: No I can give no reason. 
BOI:  Were any conditions different, which may have effected the 
demining? 
Deminer: Yes, it had been raining the night before so the soil was heavier to work. 
BOI: Were you under the influence of alcohol or any drugs when the accident took 
place? 
Deminer: No.  
 
Reference: Section Leader Statement 
I, [Name excised] called all deminers at 6.45 a.m. in the morning and briefed them as usual 
and took to the demining site and asked them to work and also I visited the places where they 
were working.  At about 7.30am I changed duty to the other deminers and I was on duty.  At 
about 8am I took them for their breakfast who were resting and I too had breakfast.  At about 
8.30am I changed the shift and allowed them to go for their breakfast and this was when the 
incident took place and I was about 300 metres away supervising the other deminers.  It was 
about 8.40 I heard a blast and came back to the location and I saw smoke coming up and 
also I noticed [The Victim] was seated on the ground, I realized that an accident had taken 
place.  While proceeding to the incident site I informed the medic and driver to proceed to the 
incident site, I also called [Name excised] and took him to assist me.  I saw [the Victim] was 
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having injuries on his cheek and elbow. I with [Name excised] took the injured man to the 
place where the medic was.  After he was treated by the medic, the medic and [Name 
excised] (driver) took the injured to hospital.  Signed: [Name excised]  
Reference: Amendment to Section Leader Statement, [Name excised] 
[The Victim] of Section A-03 met with an accident in the demining field at about 8.40 in the 
morning.  I, [Name excised] was away about 300 metres from the blasting place.  When I was 
only I heard the blasting noise and turned back saw [the Victim] laying down on the ground. 
Immediately I informed the medic and the driver and rushed to the place.  When I with [Name 
excised] took the injured to a safety place where the medic was.  Later he was then to 
hospital at about 8.45 with the medic [Name excised] in the vehicle of [Name excised].  Later 
on I went to the place of the incident where the blast took place and closed the road of the 
deminers area and brought all the deminers to the camp. Signed: [Name excised] 
BOI Interview: 
The following observations were made during an interview of [Name excised],by the BOI team 
at the demining site on the 8th July 2004.  BOI confirmed the written statements taken by [the 
Demining group]. The following questions and answers should be seen as an amendment to 
the initial statement of the individual. 
BOI: Arriving at the accident scene and noticing the type of injuries in the deminer’s 
face, what were your first thoughts? 
SL: [The Victim] did not work with his visor down. Just five minutes before the 
accident I visited [the Victim] on site, told him to keep the visor down and to go slow since the 
visor would get covered in damp more quickly. 
BOI:  Did you observe other deminers in your section working “visors up” 
before? 
SL:  Yes, on several occasions during the last couple of weeks. 
BOI:  How did/do you react? 
SL:  I order them to put the visor down and give them a warning. 
BOI:  Did you observe [the Victim] working “visor up”? 
SL:  Yes, several times. 
BOI:  Why do you think the deminers sometimes do work “visor up”? 
SL: In the area we are working now, early morning before the sun is really heating up 
the ground and air, the deminers face the difficulty that their visors on the inside are getting 
covered with damp – so they can’t see properly. 
BOI:  And what are they doing? 
SL:  They lift the visor and wipe the damp off. 
BOI:  From your perspective, what could have caused the accident? 
SL:                              The ground condition compared to the day before the accident 
occurred were slightly different – since it has been raining heavily the night before. The 
ground was softer than the day before. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the Victim 
was working with his visor raised and his error was not effectively corrected. If he was able to 
work in breach of one basic rule, he may also have been working in breach of others. The 
secondary cause is listed as “Victim inattention” because the investigators decided that this 
was the most likely cause. 
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